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THE P L A C E  OF FRANCIS  BACON I N  THE 
HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
RANCIS BACON has been popularly accounted as the F father  of modern ‘science and its method. Unfor- 
tunately, that  sort  of title has been given to  many people. 
In  fact, it must be remarked that  on the tree of knowledge, 
considered as a family tree, many a “bar sinister” is hung; 
for  it is rare in science that  the son knows his own father. 
Even where parentage may be conceivable, an oblique 
descent is so much more the rule than the exception, that  
it is quite possible that we can find a more appropriate 
name for  the relation which Bacon bore to  the several 
scientific disciplines. 
Let  us spend a few moments in investigating this problem 
of paternity. T h e  question is not one of the importance of 
Bacon, but rather more definite. I t  may be stated as fol- 
lows: If there had been no Bacon, would the future of 
science have been essentially different, or would its develop- 
ment have been materially slower? I think we may give the 
negative answer to  both these questions. Le t  us consider, 
therefore, the states of various modern sciences, and see i f  
they may be traced back more or less directly to  a source. 
Probably we can all agree that up to  the middle of the 
last century, a t  least, the most important body of natural 
science was that of physics and astronomy, with its mathe- 
matical systematization. Along this branch the lines of 
descent seem straighter than elsewhere. T w o  modern 
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names are characteristic of it more than any others. Ein- 
stein is first, not only in Relativity, but also in Quantum 
Theory. PoincarC is the other name that I should give. 
If I were to  add a third it would be Planck. T h e  genesis of 
their ideas lies first, and very noticeably in the case of 
Einstein, in scientific and philosophical speculations which 
go back to  antiquity; the principles which are enunciated 
may almost be called “final causes”, and have a dignity 
which does not result from any mere induction. They pay 
tribute to  all the philosophers from the time of Thales and  
Pythagoras, with the possible exception of those in the 
line from Bacon to  Hume. 
T h e  more particular concepts in modern atomistic and 
relativistic theories lie on lines which have all passed 
through Maxwell. H e r e  again, the ideas on electricity rep- 
resent a cultivation of the broad ideas of Faraday by means 
of the mathematical plough forged by Lagrange and La- 
place; for Faraday very largely succeeded in his task of 
systematizing that domain of knowledge which is concerned 
with electricity and magnetism. Tyndall says of him that 
he was recognized, probably without a dissentient voice, 
as the prince of physical investigators of his age. 
T h e  first researches of Faraday were concerned with 
theories that were already subjects of discussion a t  his 
time; for instance, that all forms of electricity were the 
same, whether they occurred in the battery, the fish, with 
magnetism, thermally, or in the electric machine, this being 
a theory which our own Franklin had helped to  make defi- 
nite with his kite. If we continue these researches forward 
they form a long chain of speculation suggested by experi- 
ment and experiment suggested by speculation-a single 
continuous thread which Faraday rapidly unrolled until 
nearly the time of his death. If we continue the same 
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questions backward we find them derived from those be- 
ginnings which Gilbert, the contemporary of Bacon, disen- 
tangled ‘from the fables of the Ancients. 
T h e  mechanical ideas of Poincard and Maxwell go back 
to a contemporary of Bacon, namely, the great Galileo. 
This line passes through Lagrange and Laplace back to  
Newton, and thence to  Kepler and Galileo. T h e  methods 
of these scientists were more or less the same, and like that 
of Faraday; they were not afraid of following a slender 
thread of bold speculation; they turned repeatedly to  ex- 
periments or calculations which might justify their theories, 
but only to  follow the speculation itself further and with 
renewed enthusiasm. 
Obviously this line of descent does not pass very closely 
to  Francis Bacon. In  fact, it is not merely in a figurative 
sense that students of science speak of Galileo as the first 
pupil of Archimedes. For when this great Italian, who was 
more proficient in playing the lute than in the study of 
medicine, t o  which he had been destined, turned to  the 
mathematical and mechanical speculations which satisfied 
his curiosity and gave full scope to  his imagination, he did 
so during time filched from Galen, by eavesdropping a t  
one Ricci’s lectures on Euclid, and by perusing the volumes 
of Archimedes. These, in the imperfect state in which they 
were transmitted by the Arabs, were not entirely intelligible 
to Europeans; but Galileo plunged into them, and reconsti- 
tuted from them the methods which the modern world has 
only lately realized go  back to  Archimedes. One may 
instance the problem of the hydrostatic balance and the 
determination of pressures and centers of gravity. All this 
may be said in spite of the slow but continuous development 
of mathematical methods during the late Middle Ages and 
early Renaissance. 
76 Lectures on Francis Bacon 
Given Bacon’s neglect of mathematics, it is not surprising 
that  these mathematical methods go back on a line which 
Bacon does not grasp. On  this line stands the philosopher 
Leibnitz, in a fundamental sense. Leibnitz paid tribute 
to  Francis Bacon, although he regarded him as over- 
emphasizing the experimental side of knowledge. But it 
is most odd that  it should be just on the mathematical side 
that there should be a connection from Bacon to  Leibnitz. 
This  ironical obliquity we pass over a t  present in order to  
have the opportunity of developing the scandal later, and 
more fully. 
Of course we have not covered everything in this rapid 
survey. W e  have not mentioned that Boyle put numbers on 
the theories of Torricelli and Pascal ; that  mathematics is 
indebted to  Descartes, t o  the superb Euler and many others ; 
that  Tycho Brahe resuscitated temporarily a theory of the 
solar system which combined the vices rather than the vir- 
tues of both Copernicus and Ptolemy ; and that Cardinal 
Maff eo Barberini, later Pope Urban VIII, presented to his 
friend Galileo the attraction of the theory of relativity as 
a compromise with that of the Inquisition, only to  be met 
temporarily with Galileo’s super-Baconian attitude of def- 
erence to  what he regarded as experimental fact. 
It is no new 
thing to  offer homage to  the prestige of Harvey in the 
fields of medicine and physiology. Harvey, however, was 
again a contemporary of Francis Bacon. H e  brought to  
England the tradition and methods of Vesalius and Fabri- 
cius, f rom their home in Padua. These men were the pre- 
cursors of the science of anatomy. 
In  the field which is more particularly biology, four mod- 
ern names are on the tongues of all men. These are Dar- 
win, Wallace, Pasteur, and Mendel. W e  have been told 
Let  us turn to  other sciences as briefly. 
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that Darwin describes himself as having commenced his 
research in the true Baconian manner by collecting all the 
facts. However, we find that Darwin had in the back of 
his mind the theories and concepts of Malthus and that 
Wallace also pondered often on the “revolting ratios of 
Malthus”. Evolution, as such, goes back, not merely to 
Lamarck but even to  Thales and Anaximander ; while Bacon 
expressly casts the idea aside. 
Pasteur pursued one idea from chemistry to  biology, and 
thence around the world. T h e  chemists themselves had 
gradually found the threads to  lead them from alchemy to  
the discovery and laws of chemical transformations. Fran- 
Lis Bacon, it is true, insisted that there was much humbug 
in alchemy, but it was the earlier Franciscan Friar Roger 
Bacon1 who took the bigger step of actual accomplish- 
ment in separating par t  of the dross from the gold in that 
science. 
Mendel was moved by an ideal quite different from that 
of Francis Bacon in introducing numbers essentially into 
the explanation of biological phenomena, and handing so 
much of it over into the dominion of the rebellious discipline 
which1 Bacon wanted always to  keep in a minor r81e. 
It seems clear that Bacon is not directly responsible for 
much of modern science, and that a great deal of the credit 
which he has acquired in this direction is due to the fact 
that he lived a t  the beginning of a scientific age which 
merges continuously into the present. But why does that 
age join continuously with ours? W h y  is it that the lively 
court of Frederick 11, and the brilliant revivals of science 
’ CHRONOLOGY: Roger Bacon, 1214-1294; Leonard0 da Vinci, 1452- 
1519; Copernicus, 1473-1543; Montaigne, 1533-1592; Gilbert, 1540-1603; 
FRANCIS BACON, 1561-1626; Galileo, 1564-1642; Kepler, 1571-1630; Har- 
vey, 1578-1657; Descartes, 1596-1650; Torricelli, 1608-1647 ; Pascal, 1623- 
1662; Newton, 1642-1727; Leibnitz, 1646-1716. 
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typified by Roger Bacon, by Leonardo da Vinci, and by 
various Pre-Cartesians were all without sensible effect, while 
from the time of Francis Bacon onward Science flung itself 
forward by leaps and bounds, making conquests right and 
left, as ambitious and as successful as Cresar’s armies? W e  
know that the effect of the scientific accomplishment of 
Spain was to  give that country elsewhere the reputation of 
being the home of black magic, and that Roger Bacon’s im- 
mense discoveries were garbled and distorted in the hearsay 
of succeeding generations until they became the possible 
products only of a man who sprouted the horns of the devil. 
And it is precisely for this reason that we cannot regard 
Roger Bacon o r  Leonardo as progenitors of modern culture. 
T h e  question is answered in the lives of two men, Galileo 
and Newton. I t  was Newton who took the work of Galileo 
and Kepler, and erected thereon the vast theoretical system 
whose ramifications extend through th.e whole structure of 
our material civilization. I am taking the emphasis on this 
idea from Whitehead, natural as I find it from my own 
point of view. Whitehead writes the following: 
But our modern civiliza- 
tion is due to  the fact that in the year when Galileo died, 
Newton was born. Think for  a moment of the possible 
course of history supposing that the life’s work of these 
two men were absent. A t  the commencement of the eight- 
eenth century many curious and baffling facts of physical 
science would have been observed, vaguely connected by 
detached and obscure hypotheses. But in the absence of B 
clear physical synthesis, with its overwhelming success in 
the solution of problems which from the most remote 
antiquity had excited attention, the motives for the next 
“Archimedes left no successor. 
‘Science and Civilization, edited by F. S. Marvin, Oxford University 
Press (1923). 
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advance would have been absent. All epochs pass, and 
the scientific ferment of the seventeenth century would have 
died down. Locke’s philosophy would never have been 
written; and Voltaire when he visited England would have 
carried back to  France merely a story of expanding com- 
merce and of the political rivalries between aristocratic 
factions. Europe might then have lacked the French in- 
tellectual movement. But the Fates do not always offer the 
same gifts twice, and it is possible that the eighteenth cen- 
tury might then have prepared for the western races an 
intellectual sleep of a thousand years, prosperous with the 
quiet slow exploitation of the American continent, as man- 
ual labor slowly subdued its rivers, its forests and its 
prairies.” 
Whitehead remarks that the result might possibly have 
been happier, since the chariot of Phcebus is a dangerous 
vehicle. Indeed, we have seen in the last few years how 
reckless Phaethon narrowly escaped dumping us all in the 
ditch. N o r  are  we sure that war is the only kind of ditch. 
That ,  however, is not now our concern. Our present inter- 
est lies in seeing the methods of science emerge from inse- 
cure ground, where they were surrounded, and perhaps on 
the point of being overwhelmed again, by the interest in 
the past and the authority of the ancients. 
Manifestly, as we have portrayed this development, we 
cannot say that  Bacon, whatever he may stand for  as a 
symbol in the popular mind, is the father of science. It is 
equally evident from the scientific societies which were 
founded in his name and his eminence as it was portrayed 
in the first lecture of this series, that  he has an acknowledged 
position. Am I merely flippant if I call him possibly the 
step-father of the sciences? 
Before we consider various scientific methods more in 
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detail, let us point out one or two instances where the ideas 
of Bacon have born direct fruit. I n  the first place, we have 
the subject of law, where we were told by the second lec- 
turer how much the modern legal practice and point of 
view derives from Bacon. W e  learned that  the domain 
of Equity, as distinguished from Common Law, is Bacon’s 
province: his conquest, i f  not his discovery. 
A second instance comes from Bacon’s emphasis on 
what he calls pe te rgenera ,  that  is to  say, the sports or 
monsters or freaks of nature. H i s  idea is that  by study- 
ing these abnormal things, experimenting on them and com- 
paring them with the more usual ones, we can better come 
to  an understanding of the normal process o r  situation. 
This  is exactly the method which, we are told, Pinel used, 
a t  the end of the eighteenth century, in investigating mental 
phenomena; an investigation of insanity led to  an under- 
standing of many processes of the normal mind. Similarly, 
psychologists investigate sleep through hypnosis. Another 
classic example is the method of the kindergarten, which 
arose through the treatment of the subnormal child. I t  is, 
perhaps, natural t o  investigate the unusual and striking 
situation, for  that  is what awakens curiosity. But it is a t  
least Bacon’s merit t o  have focused attention on it as a key 
to  nature. 
T h e  third instance that  we give is that  far-fetched one to  
which I have already alluded in mentioning Leibnitz. 
Among the scientists who founded the Royal Society, the 
project of a universal language was much discussed. I ts  
prominence was undoubtedly due not merely to  the ever- 
present need of secret codes in the unfriendly intercourse 
between princes and diplomats, but also to  the fact that  
Bacon expounded their nature a t  some length in that  ex- 
tensive and systematic survey of the field of knowledge 
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which he calls “De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum”. 
Wilkins (1614-1672), Bishop of Chester, published a man- 
ual of secret correspondence. I t  suggested a second at- 
tempt, better and more scientific, which was made in 1661 
by Delgarno. T h e  latter essay may be described, in mod- 
ern terms, as a sort  of index by letters to  Roget’s The- 
saurus. It consisted in dividing concepts into seventeen 
main categories, each designated by the initial letter of a 
corresponding word. Each class was again divided into 
subclasses by a second letter, and so on. T h e  sequences 
of letters thus built up could be used to form code messages. 
Wilkins took up the matter again, and amplified the main 
classification to  forty concepts, so that  letters would not 
suffice, and he had to  use conventional symbols. 
Leibnitz in the year 1671 became actively interested in 
the problem with the idea of making the symbolic language 
truly ideographic, and thus more universal and of more phil- 
osophical interest. In  other words, if  one concept be de- 
fined in terms of others, the symbol for  that  concept should 
be a direct and definite combination of those others. T h e  
invention of symbols might be carried out in some such way 
as this : When any finite number of concepts were analyzed, 
they could be explained in terms of some sub-group of them, 
until finally ideas should be arrived a t  which were simple 
concepts, and could not further be reduced. T h a t  is, they 
could not be explained or  defined except in a vicious circle. 
W h a t  would be more natural then than to  represent these 
primary ideas by numbers which could not further be re- 
duced, Le., by prime numbers? T h e  composite ideas would 
then be represented by composite numbers whose factors 
corresponded to  the primary ideas involved. 
For  example, if we take animal as a primary concept (of 
course, that  is not necessary), and represent it by the prime 
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number 2, and similarly if we represent rational by 3, we 
must represent man by 6, so that the equation 
indicates the statement: 
6 = 2 X 3  
M a n  is a rational animal. 
May I suggest that  you reflect on the question as to  whether 
3 X 3 is 9 or merely 3, and 6 X 14 is 84 or  merely 427 
This  sort of representation is more than a mere code. 
It is also more philosophical than a merely ideographic 
language. Thus when the Chinese represent “peace” by a 
symbol which portrays a woman in a house, and “discord” 
by the addition of another woman symbol under the same 
roof, the graphic representation appeals to  the cynic in all 
of us, but does not really analyze the concept. 
To  Leibnitz it seemed desirable to  translate his numbers 
into words, by means of a simple correspondence, so that 
they might be easily and systematically spoken. H e  even 
had a vision of poetry in his universal language. But what 
is noteworthy is that  he recognized the difficulty of his 
project, and held to  its importance all his life. H e  saw 
that the construction of such a language required the 
analysis of existing concepts in a great encyclopedia, that  
it demanded the progress of theoretical knowledge in all 
directions, and a t  the same time made th,at progress more 
feasible by means of a direct method for  synthesizing con- 
cepts. But he was confident that  the loyal cooperation of 
a few men for  a few years would yield a substantial increase 
in science by means of such an investigation. H e  sought 
for  many years, but in vain, to  interest the Royal Society 
in the project. I am afraid, had he succeeded, one of the 
practical results would have been to  afford the Gladstones 
of various times and localities an opportunity to  regard the 
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registration a t  the Court House of fresh synthetic concepts, 
or of new primary ideas ( f o r  incorporation into the Official 
Encyclopedia) as a capital means for collecting fees or 
taxes, 
Given the difficulty of the task, Leibnitz made various 
compromises. Thus he invented a new Latin, gradually 
purging it of its grammatical difficulties in a systematic 
manner, and enriching it with new concepts, thereby devis- 
ing a scheme of construction for  international languages 
which has become most prominent in recent times.1 But 
shall we say that the original, more thoroughly philosophic 
attempt is devoid of fruit? In  answer, we have only to  
think of the modern extensive development of the algebra 
of logic and the possible relation of that algebra to  its 
arithmetic. Moreover, Leibnitz himself made a contribu- 
tion to  his language by a systematic analysis of geometry- 
an analysis which is again being prosecuted a t  the present 
time from new points of view. T h e  most striking instance, 
however, is that Leibnitz’s invention of the symbols now 
used in differential calculus-which, in fact, really make a 
calculus out of Newton’s theory of fluxions-was a direct 
and conscious contribution to  an ideographic language. 
Thus developed by Leibnitz, the secret code becomes a 
universal logical language, which involves a general science, 
or a t  least a general scheme of theoretical science, and an 
encyclopedia of concepts. Nevertheless the result is truly 
a direct descendant of that  Baconian discussion of secret 
codes. It must be remarked that i f  Bacon could be con- 
fronted with his offspring, he would very promptly disin- 
herit it. 
‘Those who desire to pursue this subject will be led to Couturat’a La 
logique de Leibnitz, Paris (1901), and, for the less philosophical languages, 
to GuCrard’s Short History of the International Language Movement, New 
York (1921) .  
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I n  order to  understand now, in more detail, the place of 
Francis Bacon in the history of scientific method, let us 
begin with the great sceptic Montaigne (1533-1592), 
whose essays served as one model for  Bacon. Impressed 
by the turbulence and conflict amid which he lived and dis- 
mayed by the intolerance and uncompromising belief which 
he saw on every hand and in every sect, yet a t  the same 
time conscious of the real world about him and imbued with 
the literature of ancient ages in many ways superior t o  his 
own, it is not surprising that Montaigne regards dogma- 
tism as a presumptuous vanity. H e  also laughs a t  the 
efforts of science, which hardly even serves to  convince us 
of our own ignorance. Philosophy is a sterile conflict of 
variable opinions. H e  puts man, an animal, down on the 
same stage as the other animals, playing their parts as 
cruelly and as ineffectually. Wha t  are  the exploits of con- 
querors? Thei r  armies, furious monsters of myriad arms 
and heads, a re  merely angry ant-heaps, which may a t  any 
time be annihilated through a contrary gust of wind or the 
misstep of a horse. 
Reason is to  him a dangerous tool, and he who uses it 
loses himself along with his dogmatic enemies. I t  is well 
to  keep the multitude under the subjection of law and tradi- 
tion, and he himself obeys the police regulations, municipal 
and ecclesiastical, although he has carried himself along 
the road of doubt so far that to  his mind all the human 
faculties are  discredited. This does not prevent him, 
however pessimistic, from making extensive and acute 
observations, nor his soul from being a source of kindness 
and gentility. H e  is no hero, and no Macchiavellist. 
Francis Bacon believes that he provides the way of put- 
ting in order the universe which Montaigne has left in such 
an unhappy state. H e  devises a method which he thinks 
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will be easy to  apply and will increase the domain of science 
enormously and rapidly. Wi th  this, incidentally, the logic 
of Aristotle will be seen to  be mere mental gymnastics. H e  
makes a grand survey of knowledge. In  this survey he 
forms first a main division of knowledge into three parts 
which he calls History, Poesy, and Science or  Philosophy; 
these a re  the branches which correspond respectively to  
what were regarded as the three mental faculties of mem- 
ory, imagination, and reason. Then  these principal divi- 
sions are  cross-divided under the captions Natural  and Civil 
( the latter including ecclesiastical) and finally redivided 
according to  subject so that the classification becomes more 
and more minute. 
In  Natural  History should be contained an account of 
the Generations, which are the phenomena of nature work- 
ing freely, the Pretergenerations, which are  the abnormali- 
ties and errors of nature of which we have already spoken, 
and finaIly the History of the Arts  or  Mechanic History, in 
which would eventually be included, for example, the mod- 
ern engineering arts. By this means a table may be con- 
structed of things still wanting as well as of those already 
obtained. 
Bacon tends to  diminish the importance of the imagina- 
tion in arriving a t  scientific t ruth;  that  is necessary, from 
Bacon’s point of view, since imagination is a most variable 
quality in men, and must be put in a minor place if, as he 
hopes, the advancement of science is to  be the cooperative 
effort of many ordinary minds. W h a t  interests Bacon in 
poesy is the fable or myth which he regards as a first essay, 
but of minor utility, in arriving a t  scientific truth. In  these 
allegories the mind puts together things according to  de- 
sire, without much respect for reality. W h a t  is to  be the 
real method of turning natural history into science is the 
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systematic use of the reason in the way which Bacon ex- 
plains in the “Novum Organum”. 
This  systematic method is an induction with the help of 
experiment. According to  Bacon’s idea it is possible to  
arrive a t  a scientific theory by a process of exclusion, more 
or less as an argument by reductio ad absurdum is used in 
mathematics, but the process this time is to be carried out 
by interrogating the facts of nature, normal, monstrous or 
constrained by art. In  other words, hypotheses are to  be 
eliminated successively with reference to  fact or experi- 
ment until only the hypothesis which must be true remains. 
T h e  famous Galileian controversy is a case in point, for 
Galileo already had the same idea with regard to  exhaus- 
tion by experimental tests. H e  felt that it was demon- 
strable by appeal to  the facts of nature that the Copernican 
theory was the only one which would “save appearances”- 
i.e., account for  all the facts-and must therefore be the 
true one. But could such a position ever be justified? Car- 
dinal Barberini asks Galileo i f  it would not be possible for 
God to  arrange and move the orbits and planets in some 
other manner than the Copernican, so that all the phe- 
nomena evident in the skies could be accounted for. If this 
were not to  be the case it would be necessary for Galileo to  
prove that these phenomena could not be obtained by any 
system except the Copernican, since God would have the 
power and the corresponding knowledge to  accomplish any- 
thing that was not in contradiction with his other acts. 
And otherwise Galileo would have no right t o  reduce Divine 
Power and Wisdom to  the system which he had c0nceived.l 
I n  fact, even if the Ptolemaic system could be demonstrated 
to  be false by reference to  experiment, the system of Tycho 
‘ P .  Duhem, Essai sur la notion de thhorie physique de Platon A Galilee, 
Paris (1908) ,  p. 1 3 5 .  
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Brahe, which made the Ear th  the centre of motion but let 
Venus and Mars  move in orbits about the Sun, would have 
sufficed a t  the time of Galileo to  explain all the known 
phenomena. 
I n  other words, no matter what hypotheses are  SUC. 
cessively eliminated by experiment, there is no single hy- 
pothesis that remains. W e  cannot say that  the given set of 
facts of experience will contradict necessarily every other 
hypothesis that might be imagined. T o  state the matter 
paradoxically, progress in the science of nature consists in 
proving that theories are  not true. 
Galileo in his celebrated dialogue of 1632 offered lip 
service to  this reasoning by pointing out that  it was open 
to  God to  move the system of the world in whatever com- 
plicated manner H e  chose, although the simple manner was 
quite evident. This  did not meet the issue either logically 
or  theologically. T h e  argument for relativity failed tu  
impress the uncompromising scientist, and the equally un- 
compromising theologians felt that  their only recourse was 
the argurnentum ad hominem. 
T h e  difficulty is aggravated instead of diminished in the 
general Baconian method, for in the general situation the 
hypotheses to  be chosen are themselves lacking. If a hy- 
pothesis already a t  hand cannot be demonstrated by this 
method, is it possible to  arrive a t  one and prove it a t  the 
same time? I t  is for  this reason that Couturat and other 
logicians say that  no scientific result was ever obtained by 
the Baconian method, and none ever will be. This  does not 
mean that important results cannot be won merely by a 
systematic experimentation without any new theory ; and 
perhaps such methods may be regarded as derived from 
Bacon. Thus in organic chemistry, when one hopes for a 
certain property, one may eliminate one compound after 
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another until by good luck such a property may be obtained; 
and then one may number it in the six hundreds o r  the nine 
hundreds to  indicate the industry rather than the science 
by which the result has been achieved. I t  is, however, the 
obtaining of theoretical results which is Bacon’s idea. 
If the carrying out of this idea were possible, it would 
be necessary, in order t o  clear the way for the formation 
of true principles, t o  guard against prejudices. Bacon at- 
tempts to  do  this systematically by listing them in three 
classes of fallacies of false appearances : Idola Tribus, 
Idola Specus and Idola Fori, he calls them, prejudices “of 
the tribe”, due to  the general nature of mankind, “of the 
cave”, due to  the narrow bounds of each mind, and “of the 
market-place” respectively. T h a t  is to  say, men tend to  
imagine that nature acts as men do, and they make them- 
selves a rule of nature (so that all idealistic philosophy for  
Bacon would be Idola Tribus) ,  or secondly, they see too 
narrowly from the prisons of their own minds and bodies, 
or finally, they accept the tacit implications of mere words. 
I n  such ways Bacon expected that attention should be 
focused on the facts, and that generalizations or theories 
should be obtained step by step, by induction from the facts, 
making sure that each step should be solidly placed. I s  it 
a question whether these so systematic, laborious and un- 
inspired processes would ever, as compared with the more 
imaginative methods, give the rapid advancement of learn- 
ing which Bacon anticipated? T h a t  question was surely 
answered by Newton. 
Another way of resolving the universal skepticism of 
Montaigne, diametrically opposite to  the plan of Bacon, was 
developed by Descartes. H e  also thought that  he could 
make the progress of science and philosophy sure and rapid, 
and that the mind could be provided with a tool which 
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would give it the power to  jack itself up from one truth 
to  another by easy stages, and thus to  answer gradually 
one a f te r  another the difficult questions of physics and 
metaphysics. H i s  method consisted briefly, first, in a hypo- 
thetical skepticism: nothing to  be assumed but what was 
presented so clearly and distinctly to  his mind that he could 
not doubt it. Secondly, he was to  divide any of his diffi- 
culties into a s  many small parts as possible. Thirdly, he 
was to  conduct his ideas in orderly fashion commencing 
with the simplest and easiest to  know, in order to  mount 
stepwise to  the most complicated subjects. And finally, he 
would make such numerous and general reviews that noth- 
ing would be omitted, 
“Those long chains of reasoning, quite simple and easy, 
which geometers are accustomed to  employ in order to  
achieve their most difficult demonstrations, gave me cause 
to  think that all things which might fall under human 
knowledge might follow from each other in the same 
fashion ( Idolon Specusl comments Mahaffy), and that 
provided only we take care to  receive nothing as true which 
may not be so, and preserve the proper order to  deduce one 
truth from another, there would be none so remote that 
we could not finally reach it, nor so hidden that we could 
not discover it.” Descartes then instances his own discovery 
of analytic geometry as an illustration of his method. 
One may criticise this effort, which endeavors to  proceed 
so logically on the basis of a few axioms, from almost the 
same angle as that  of Bacon, who tries to  arrive a t  theories 
by conclusive experiments. Neither allows enough place 
f o r  the imagination. Kno,wledge is t o  be advanced by the 
invention of new concepts. But what makes a concept sig- 
nificant? W h y  did Descartes d o  for  analytic geometry 
what Euclid did not d o ?  I t  is easy to  see concepts after 
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they are there, but only the Galileo, the Newton o r  the 
Darwin can build up those tremendously significant ones out 
of their personal reactions to  nature. 
In  general, in a causal series, as Leibnitz points out, 
every event is caused by a previous one, and so on to  an 
infinite regression; hence no one of the events contains 
the explanation of the entire series; for that explanation 
one must go outside the series. I t  is brilliance of imagina- 
tion which makes the glory of science. 
I hope I may be pardoned for turning finally to  the r6le 
in Bacon’s method of the discipline in which I am most 
interested. Mathematics for Bacon occupies an important 
position but not a thrilling one. H e  sees in it merely the 
means of stating formulae or putting in convenient shape 
results which are, in their essential causal relations, already 
obtained. T h e  mathematical work in astronomy, he would 
say, was an assistance in navigation but told nothing that 
satisfied him as a scientist. Perhaps that view is still held 
rather commonly. I t  is not inconsistent with Bacon’s view 
of induction by experiment, but, on the other hand, it is 
not a necessary consequence of such a view. W e  see this 
fact clearly if  we turn again to  Galileo, who as we have 
pointed out, had the same view of exhausting all possibili- 
ties by experiment. Mathematics plays an essential part  in 
the development of his theories, as it does later with New- 
ton, for between them they bring the science of mechanics 
into being. 
Moreover Galileo, whether or not you say it is possible, 
actually does get new ideas about space out of mathematics. 
Mathematics for him is a field of discovery; he sees novel 
relations there which he tries t o  prove, as mathematicians 
now meet striking relations in the theory of numbers, which 
Bacon’s method would hardly suggest and Descartes’ 
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method has not yet proven. Thus  Galileo sees a line or 
curve as infinitely divisible, and thinks to  prove it by devis- 
ing an experiment by means of which a small circle is made 
to  roll along with a larger concentric circle. T h e  only way 
that the small circle can be made to  keep up with the large 
one is for its circumference to  contain an infinite number 
of vacua. Ipso facto the circumference is infinitely divisible. 
Nowadays we should hardly accept Galileo’s reasoning 
in this case (which of course I have not given), although 
to  a mathematician it is most suggestive. This type of 
reasoning, which generally leads to  true results, gives that 
combination of novelty and truth which Kant, later, also 
regarded as characteristic of geometry, and which led him 
to  regard space as a form of intuition. 
T h e  modern view of mathematics, as we find it say in 
Russell o r  Whitehead, is rather a development of that of 
Leibnitz a t  which I have hinted; that mathematics is a 
universal logical language, ideographic in that the :ombi- 
nation of its symbols corresponds to  the combination of the 
designated ideas, and with a syntax of operations which 
provides a calculus of deductive reasoning. W e  d o  not 
altogether agree with the positivistic philosopher who says 
(as Bacon might well have said explicitly) that by mathe- 
matics you get out a t  one end no more than you put in 
a t  the other;  we d o  not agree, even i f  he states it in the 
more amiable form that it is worth while to  have something 
by means of which you can get out a t  one end the implica- 
tions of what you put in a t  the other. Moreover, it  is the 
mathematician who has the task of deciding what ideas 
he wants t o  get out and what ideas he has to  put in, and 
since that is an essential part  of his task which no one else 
will undertake we may as well call it an essential part  of 
mathematics. Would you call a man an author if he spent 
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his time putting all possible words in all possible combina- 
tions, like some that Gulliver met in his travels? 
Let me not seem to  want t o  diminish the glory of Bacon 
by my criticisms. H i s  influence for several centuries has 
been so vast that there is no question of his greatness. In  
what direction was he grea t?  H e  manifestly was not a 
scientist, since his scientific work is hopelessly insignificant, 
even in terms of his own day. There  is no question of his 
standing beside his contemporaries Galileo, Kepler, Gilbert, 
and Harvey. H e  cannot stand beside the practically 
minded Benjamin Franklin, with whom one is tempted to  
compare him. 
His  theory of knowledge also is insufficient; but, on the 
other hand, whose is no t?  W e  must not throw him aside 
on that ground. T h e  philosophers Gassendi, Leibnitz, 
Locke, Hume, and Kant held him in high repute; and sub- 
stantial portions of most books on logic are devoted to  his 
treatment of induction. H e  was not merely a popularizer 
o r  a bally-hoo; Leibnitz and Kant had no need of such. If 
then these eminent philosophers found him estimable, was 
he not therefore great in philosophy? In that part  of 
philosophy which: deals with scientific method his compre- 
hensive and systematic expositions and his daring un- 
Baconian generalizations have earned him a high place. 
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